Volume 6
Issue 2 Spring 1966
Spring 1966

Submerged Lands—Submerged Lands Act of 1953—The Definition
of "Inland Waters"
Robert G. Meiners

Recommended Citation
Robert G. Meiners, Submerged Lands—Submerged Lands Act of 1953—The Definition of "Inland Waters",
6 Nat. Resources J. 186 (1966).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol6/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 6

SUBMERGED LANDS-SUBMERGED LANDS ACT OF 1953-THE
DEFINITION OF "INLAND WATERS" *

The recent decision by the Supreme Court in United States v. Cali.
fornia' marks the end of a twenty-year struggle. Since 1945 the ownership of submerged lands lying off the California coast has been a
matter of dispute between the two governments. More than a matter
of relative sovereignty was at stake; millions of dollars worth of oil
and gas leases were involved.
In 1945 the United States asserted its ownership to certain submerged lands and sought to enjoin California and those drilling for
oil and gas under leases granted by California. In 1947 the Supreme
Court rendered a decision in favor of the United States, stating
that California had no title or property interest in lands "underlying
the Pacific Ocean lying seaward of the ordinary low-water mark on
the coast of California, and outside of the inland waters, extending
seaward three nautical miles." 2 That decision, rather than putting
the matter to rest, was but the first step in what was to become a
continuing running battle in which Congress later became involved.
In 1948 the United States reopened the controversy by requesting a supplemental decree to identify with more particularity the
boundaries of three areas.' It so happened that these were areas
having very substantial oil-well activity. California contended that
these areas were not included in the lands won by the federal government in 1947, but were rather a part of California's inland
waters.' The Court appointed a Special Master to make an inquiry
into the matter. The Special Master (the late William H. Davis
of New York) conducted the inquiry and filed a report in 1952 that
generally favored the ownership rights of the United States.' This,
however, did not end the dispute, for in 1953 both California and
the United States filed exceptions to the report. At this point and
before the Court could take any further action, the Submerged

0

United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965) (opinion), and 86 Sup. Ct. 607
(1966) (supplemental decree).
1. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965). See also the Court's supplemental
decree issued on January 31, 1966. 86 Sup. Ct. 607 (1966).
2. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 804, 805 (1947) (order and decree). The
opinion of the Court is reported at 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
3. United States v. California, 334 U.S. 855 (1948).
4.

United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 142 (1965).

5. United States v. California, 334 U.S. 855, 856 (1948).
6. United States v. California, 344 U.S. 872 (1952).
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Lands Act 7 of 1953 became law. The act declared it to be in the pub-

lic interest that title to and ownership of lands as well as rights to
natural resources beneath navigable waters within the boundaries
of the respective states be vested in the states.8 This was not the
first appearance of such legislation. In reaction to the 1947 decision
which gave these lands to the federal government, Congress passed
a bill which nullified that decision. This measure was vetoed by
President Truman in May of 1952. However, after the Republican
victory in the election of 1952, Congress passed the present act and
President Eisenhower signed it into law.9 The act granted to each
state all submerged lands shoreward of a line three geographical
miles from its coast line. "Coast line" was derivatively defined in
terms of "the seaward limit of inland waters." 10 In a related
measure, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act," Congress declared that the United States owned all lands seaward of the lands
granted to the states in the Submerged Lands Act. Once again it
looked as though a solution to this controversy had been reached,
and once again it was but a lull in the storm.
For the time being, however, passage of the act resulted in a
temporary ceasefire. But as will be pointed out more fully below,
because the act did not define the term "inland waters" the shooting was destined to break out anew. The reason that passage of the
act brought a temporary halt to the controversy was that by virtue
of the technology of the oil industry in 1953 it was impractical to
drill for oil anywhere except close to shore, and these submerged
lands clearly belonged to California. However, by 1963 oil drilling
techniques had improved to such an extent that it became practical
to drill in deeper waters farther from the coastline.
The Special Master's report had been lying dormant because of
the passage of the act. However, with the new drilling technology,
the United States felt it to be important to ascertain with particularity the exact offshore demarcation line between state and federal
lands. Accordingly, in 1963 the United States again petitioned the
Court, this time reviving the Special Master's report, filing new
exceptions to it, and redescribing the issues as modified by the act.
The battle thus joined anew, California also filed new exceptions to
7. 67 Stat. 29-32 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1964).
8. 67 Stat. 30 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1964).
9. N.Y. Times, May 18, 1965, p. 1, col. 2.
10. 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1301(c) (1964).
11. 67 Stat. 462-70 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1964).
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the Special Master's report. 12 The stage was then set for the 1965
decision.
In a five-to-two opinion the Court decided in favor of the United
States. The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Harlan;
the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Clark refrained from participating. One writer has suggested what may be the obvious reason for
their non-participation: Chief Justice Warren is from California
and Mr. Justice Clark is from Texas, another state primarily affected by this decision.
In the opinion of the majority, the "focal point" in this case was
the interpretation to be placed on the term "inland waters" as used
in the act.' 4 The principal contention of California was that this term
should be defined as including those waters which the states historically considered to be inland waters.' The United States contended that the act merely moved the boundary line between state
and federal lands out three miles from the line established by the
1947 decree.' If the contention of California concerning its historical expectations had been upheld, this would have encompassed
more territory than might be imagined. The California Constitution of 1849, in defining the boundaries of the state, includes "all
the islands, harbors, and bays, along and adjacent to the Pacific
Coast."'1 7 As a practical matter this would probably have given
California submerged lands extending more than fifty miles into
the Pacific Ocean.'8
Since the act, in its final version, did not define the term "inland
waters," the Court looked to the legislative history. The majority
opinion first pointed out that two changes were made in the act as it
passed through the Senate. As first introduced, the act not only defined "inland waters" but included as part of that definition the
state's "historic bays."'" This definition was deleted before final
passage, and in its final version the act was silent on any definition
of the term. The second change made as the act passed through
Congress, to which the Court pointed, was the addition of a three12. United States v. California, 375 U.S. 927 (1963).
13. N.Y. Times, May 18, 1965, p. 1, col. 2.
14. 381 U.S. at 149.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Cal. Const. art. 12 (1849). Virtually the same definition is repeated in the
present constitution, Cal. Const. art. 21, § 1.
18. N.Y. Times, May 18, 1965, p. 1, col. 2.
19. 381 U.S. at 150.
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mile limitation on the extent of a state's claim to submerged lands. 20
Taking these two changes together, the Court concluded that California's contention regarding the act's intention to restore to it
those submerged lands that it had historically considered as belonging to the state could not prevail. 21 Pointing specifically to the deletion of the definition of "inland waters," the Court concluded that
Congress intended to leave this definition to the courts, acting independently of the act.
Having determined congressional intent in this manner, the Court
pointed out that no prior Supreme Court decision had ever precisely defined "inland waters. '2 2 The Court then looked to its 1947
opinion in this controversy and concluded that the 1947 opinion
"clearly indicates" that this term was to have an "international content. ' 23 To bolster this conclusion the Court added in a footnote
that the 1947 decision "relied heavily on the international respon'24
sibilities of the Federal Government.
What is the "international content" to be given to the term?
Where do we look to find it? When the Special Master filed his
report in 1952,25 he indicated that at that time there was no internationally accepted definition of the term. 26 However, the Court felt
that since 1952 a "settled international rule" had been established
which defined the term.2 7 This definition, the Court says, is contained in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, which was ratified by the United States in 1961 and went into
force in 1964.28 The definition of "inland waters" contained in the
Convention is in terms of a 24-mile closing line coupled with a semi29
circle test.
This Convention definition of "inland waters" is the definition
adopted by the Court for purposes of determining the line of de20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. 381 U.S. at 162.
23. Ibid.
24. 381 U.S. at 162 n.25.
25. United States v. California, 344 U.S. 872 (1952).
26. 381 U.S. at 163.
27. Ibid.
28. 381 U.S. at 164.
29. For the Court's statement of the Convention definition of "inland waters," using
the 24-mile closing line and the semicircle test, see its supplemental decree in United
States v. California, 86 Sup. Ct. 607, 608 (1966). In practical application, the definition
means that California loses, and that oil companies in the future will seek leases from
the Secretary of the Interior, not the state of California.

NATURAL

RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 6

marcation between state and federal lands under the act.80 It is of
passing interest to note that California was not alone in arguing
against this 24-mile closing line coupled with a semicircle test; the
United States also opposed it.3 1 Nevertheless, this is now the test.
In a dissent twice the length of the majority opinion, Mr. Justice
Black is joined by Mr. Justice Douglas. The dissenting opinion
takes an entirely different view of the legislative history of the act.
It sees the act as a manifestation of congressional intent to overturn
the 1947 decision and restore to the states those lands lying within
their historic expectations but which were given to the federal government as a result of the earlier decision.8 2 This, of course, is the
California contention which the majority found to be untenable.
Also, on the question of interpreting the legislative history of the
act we see another difference of opinion. While a majority of the
Court view the two changes made in the act as being not only relevant, but proof that California's contention could not prevail, the
dissenters see these changes in an entirely different light. To them,
the deletion of the definition of "inland waters" was not a "change
of substance." 3 The addition of the three-mile limitation was "just
a minor change of verbiage. ' 34 While not passing on the amount of
submerged lands that would be included in California's historic
claim, the dissent would honor this claim. And to carry out what the
dissent believes to be the "congressional command in the Submerged
Lands Act," it would "refer the case to a Special Master to give
California" the opportunity of proving what its historic expectations
really are. 5
Thus, twenty years of litigation over California's off-shore oil
rights has ended, and California has lost. To place the decision in
specific geographic terms, Monterey Bay is "inland waters" but San
30. 381 U.S. at 165.
31. Id. at 164.
32. Id. at 178.
33. Id. at 205. The majority of the Court pointed to this same deletion and said
that it indicated that "Congress made plain its intent to leave the meaning of the term
[inland waters] to be elaborated by the courts, independently of the Submerged Lands
Act." 381 U.S. at 151. On the role of "intent" in statutory interpretation, a recent
writer has said, "'Intent' connotes a concern with the subjective state of mind of the
lawmakers; the courts should not attempt to determine what the legislators thought they
were doing." Bishin, The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 38 So.
Cal. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1965).
34. 381 U.S. at 206.
35. Id. at 213.
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Luis Obispo Bay, Santa Barbara Channel, Santa Monica Bay, San
Pedro Bay, San Pedro Channel, Newport Bay, and the Gulf of
Santa Catalina are not.3 What this means in terms of lost oil and
gas revenue will be a matter of speculation, especially as drilling
techniques improve still further to allow operations in even deeper
waters. If the dissent is correct and it was the intent of Congress in
passing the act to overturn the 1947 decision, it will be interesting
to see what Congress does about this one.
ROBERT G. MEINERSt

36. See United States v. California, 86 Sup. Ct. 607 (1966), for the Court's supplemental decree defining the inland waters of these geographic areas. See also Editorial Comment, 14 L. Ed. 2d 296 (1965).
t Associate Professor of Law, California Western University, San Diego.

